According to the second partial decision, the Ministry is responding to a Freedom of Information request dated 11 April 2022 concerning all internal and external correspondence relating to the meat tax (covering the period from 1 January 2017 to 11 April 2022). An initial partial decision had already been issued on 31 January 2024. The second partial decision is dated 9 April 2025 and states that 275 documents (including annexes) have been found.
The Netherlands is both an importer and an exporter. And that makes a “meat tax” very difficult to implement.
The documents explicitly set out the trade-off between two principles:
It is often assumed that the impact on production is limited, “given that we import a significant proportion of what we consume and, conversely, export a significant proportion of what we produce.”
If you have a consumer levy chooses (destination principle), then the logic is:
Imported meat sold to consumers in the Netherlands is subject to the levy. The measure targets Dutch consumption, so it does not matter where the meat comes from as long as it ends up in the shopping basket here. This is also stated as such in the documents.
Meat that is exported is, in fact, not subject to the consumer levy, as it is not sold to Dutch consumers. The dossier states this explicitly: “A consumer levy does not apply to meat intended for export, meaning that the effect of the levy is limited to the portion supplied to the domestic market (and to imported meat).” And lower domestic demand may even lead to an increase in exports.
So the short supply chain and imports for consumption in the Netherlands are affected, but exports are not. That creates an uneven playing field.
The report highlights a politically explosive risk: producers could benefit from the rebate scheme, whilst the levy is mainly collected from consumers. It states literally that this could have “negative implications” for public support, characterising it as “reaping the benefits, not bearing the costs”.
This is because large companies that are primarily export-oriented are less affected by the levy, whereas domestic consumers, the retail sector and the hospitality industry do feel the impact of the price increase.
The documents are strikingly candid about where the levy is likely to end up: with retailers selling to the end consumer, including butchers and supermarkets.
There is even a draft agenda for a meeting with MKB Nederland which explicitly states that the aim is to ensure that this does not result in “an excessive administrative burden” for butchers, supermarkets and the hospitality sector, and that there may be concern that it will have a “disproportionately large impact on butchers” compared to supermarkets.
The measure appears to be aimed at system management, but in practice it risks reducing the role of the cashier to a mere executor of policy. Supermarkets can smooth this over with economies of scale, data and profit margins. The butcher, however, is face to face with the customer.
The report states that socio-economic impacts, particularly on those on lower incomes, must be explicitly taken into account.
A consumer levy increases the price of meat at the checkout. Households on a tight budget have less scope to absorb this cost and are therefore more likely to be pushed towards the cheapest options. In practice, this often means ultra-processed foods and snacks with “empty” calories (low nutritional value) rather than wholesome staple foods. This increases the risk of unhealthy choices and, consequently, wider health inequalities.
Furthermore, for many people, meat is an efficient source of important nutrients. The Netherlands Nutrition Centre describes meat as a key source of protein, iron, and vitamins B1 and B12. If pricing policies result in low-income groups having less access to nutritious, relatively “concentrated” sources of essential nutrients, this is not only a matter of purchasing power but also a health risk.
Butchers, the hospitality industry, consumers and public health are paying the price.
